
How Populism Affect New Product Development :
Moderating Effects of Firm's Export and the Government's
Ideology

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Abstract

- **Recent populist trends**
- **Populism as a non-market factor** → how it relates to firms' innovation process
- **Core research goal:**
 - Exploring the connection between country-level **populism** and firm-level **Innovation**
 - Identifying the contextual factors influencing the relationship using resource dependence theory
- **Research Highlights:**
 - Populism reduces new product development by causing institutional volatility and social uncertainty
 - A firm's export behavior weakens the negative relationship between populism and new product development
 - Right-leaning tendency of the ruling party exacerbates the relationship between populism and new product development

Research Interest

Political factors in the business

Non-market Strategy, Business-government relationship, “對官”

Institutional factor as a driver of organizational adaptation and reaction

1. Political competition and government decentralization → firm lobbying (Choi, Jia, Lu, 2015)
2. Property rights institutions, contracting institutions → firm bribery (Lu, Choi, Jiménez, Bayraktar, 2021)
3. Ideological polarization → firm lobby (Lee, Jiménez, Choi, Choi. 2021)
4. Ideology fluctuation → firm bribery, innovation (working paper)
5. Left-right leading party's ideology → firm lobby (working paper)

Research Background

The context of world politics:

Populism dates back to the 19th century (Devinney and Hartwell, 2020), and become one of the most influential political forces for the objective external environment that affects the company's behavior (e.g., Brazil, Hungary, India, Poland, and the Philippines, Russia, China, Turkey)

The research field of International Business (IB):

Regard traditional political structures as the main body that influences corporate behavior

→ Very rare interests on the influence of political leaders and government features

Research tendency: the potential impact of populist institutional changes on firms/markets

→ This exploration has not yet extended to the innovation environment of firms' new product development

Previous research on new product development:

→ Paid little attention to the impact of non-market characteristics, such as policy instability

 Extend previous research by using the integrated perspective that combined resource dependence theory, knowledge-based and transaction cost's view

Literature

- **Political environments**

- Choi et al. (2015) propose that structure of political institutions influences the effectiveness of CPA.
- Competition between local governments to attract residents reduces the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents and thus make the value of corporate political activities less profitable (Jin et al., 2005)
- Decentralization or federalism of government activities also affect the extent of rent extraction of firms (e.g., Fishman and Gatti, 2002).
- Competition between local governments to attract residents reduces the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents and thus make the value of corporate political activities less profitable (Jin et al., 2005)
- Political environments affect the decision of lobbying (Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2015) and/or bribery (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007)

Literature

- **Political ideology** (Tedin, 1987, p. 65)
 - Political ideology can be conceptualized as “an interrelated set of attitudes, behaviors, and values about the goals of society and how they should be achieved”.
 - Political ideologies affect most aspects of the economy, including the strategic choices of firms (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; Gupta and Wowak, 2017)
- **Institutional theory** (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008, 2009; Van Essen et al., 2012)
 - Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Thus, according to the institution-based view, the behavior and strategy of firms are shaped by country-level institutional factors.
- **Resource dependence theory** (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
 - RDT explains how firms can manage contextual dependencies and thus how managers can act to reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence by using CPA (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Thus, Sutton et al. (2021) argue that dependence associated with various types of uncertainties promotes managers to take a problemistic search to reduce it, triggering responses such as CPA.

Literature

- **Political Uncertainty**

- political uncertainty reduce the amount and accuracy of the information available, and therefore making firm assessments, investments, and valuation more difficult (Chen et al., 2018; Stöckl and Rode, 2021; Krammer and Kafouros, 2022)
- The greater uncertainty created by populism reduces the amount of information available to firms, making it harder to firms to determine which policy changes may occur and to what extent the changes will impact their investments, increasing the costs of doing business.

Research Objectives

Research question

- Has the current populism had a detrimental effect on the performance of firms' new product development?
- What is the possible route for the inhibition effect?
- Have companies with overseas operations received fewer negative effects from populism?
- Is there a particular characteristic of populism that will additionally exacerbate the impact of populism on new product development?

Theoretical insights in four areas:

1. New product development (NPD) literature (with resource dependency theory)
2. Populism literature (expand to firm level)
3. International Business research about export (export's risk buffering effect)
4. Political ideology literature (peculiar combination of right-leaning leanings and populism)

Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypothesis

Definitions of Populism (Oxford Handbook of Populism - Kaltwasser et al., 2017)

- (1) **Ideational**: clearly distinguish the impact of populist discourse and institutional change (Devinney & Hartwell, 2022)
- (2) Political–strategic
- (3) Social-cultural
- (4) Economics (Absher et al., 2020; Bittencourt, 2012; Dornbusch & Edwards, 1990)

Müller (2015) : Populism may manifest itself as anti-establishment, hostility to elites, anger, irrationality, irresponsibility, hatred of wealth, xenophobia...but none of these are its unique characteristics.

→ Miller (2015) : the "**defining feature**" of populism is a monopoly on **the representation of "the people"**

→ Populism as a "**thin-centered**" ideology or set of ideas (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Bennett, 2022)

The ideational approach of populism: travelable (Hawkins, 2017; Bennett, 2022)

(observing corporate activity under the influence of populism needs to span multiple countries, cultures, and time periods)

 Populism database using the ideational approach: Global Populism Database (GPD)

Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypothesis

Definitions of Populism

Hawkins (2009) : populist discourse is a **unique linguistic form and content with real political consequences**, it is not just a mobilization strategy appealing to the people, but a 'thin-centered' ideology




Figure 1. Research Model

Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypothesis

Resource Dependency Theory & New Product Development (NPD) :

- NPD as an activity that transcends the boundaries of a single organization:
 - Knowledge resources needed for innovation and development are obtained from outside (Brettel and Cleven, 2011)
 - Strategy of finding partners beyond organizational boundaries has become an important means to seek competitive advantage in a turbulent environment (Berchicci, 2013; Garavelli et al., 2013; Santoro et al., 2016)
 - ↓
 - ideas, technologies, skills, policies or alliances
- Innovation performance
 - It also involves how to deliver new products to the market faster, especially in the current global competition, fragmented market, and discerning customer preferences context (Poolton et al., 2000).
 - Previous study of NPD:
 - Product or process itself (eg: De Fuentes et al., 2020)
 - Firm's internal resources (Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2009; Álvarez and Crespi, 2015)
 - Strategy (Agolla and Lill, 2016), or market competition factors (Cooper, 1999)
 - non-market factors, external resource environment etc. are rarely used to explain the success of NPD

Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypothesis

Resource Dependency Theory & New Product Development (NPD) :


- Hillman et al. (2009) : the institutional and cultural environment will affect the **resource availability**



RDT focuses on **external uncertainties** and key resources beyond the firm's control, as well as uncertainty arising from **interdependencies with external organizations** (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Wry et al., 2013).

Knowledge-based view & New Product Development (NPD) :

- Process of NPD is highly dependent on the team's **knowledge sharing, acquisition, and reorganization** process (Poolton et al., 2000)
- Example: Industry best practices into practice (Poolton et al., 2000)
 - If external source of knowledge acquisition is blocked
 - the wind vane of NPD: risk and suitability, out of the development process
 - increasing the uncertainty and failure risk of NPD

 Scientific planning of limited development resources, stable control of various resource dependencies, and a suitable and stable external environment for innovation are factors that can positively affect NPD (APQC, 2003; Cooper & Edgett, 2003; Edgett, 2011).

Hypothesis 1

Populism & NPD:

- Populist discourse calls for :
 - attack of the existing system / advocacy of the new system / bind the existing system to the interests of the conspiratorial elites
 - Establishment of a "consistent people":
 - patronage politics / disrespect for the market / anti-diversity tendency
- ➔ **Sending a special signal** → the external environment is about to undergo a great change (a deep change based on ideology) (Bennett, 2022)
- ➔ **Pervading the entire resource dependence relationship**
 - the relative bargaining power and the availability of resources among firms (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1981)
 - reduction in the quality and efficiency of new product development (Yan & Kull, 2015)
- ➔ **Suitability of NPD already generated may be reduced**
Or space for open and diverse debate on NPD reduce

H1: Country's populism has a negative effect on the performance of new products(or process) development.

Hypothesis 2

Populism & Export & NPD:

- **Firm with export :** highly sensitive to both pro-market institutions and NPD resource dependencies (Silva et al., 2019).
- **Export:**
 - Accelerating the knowledge acquisition and knowledge learning process (Sun & Hong, 2011)
 - Improving the status and legitimacy of firms (Ayyagari et al., 2012)
 - Facilitating access to financing and partners (Ayyagari et al., 2012)
 - Reducing the possible losses caused by political constraints and unpredictable market demand (Krammer & Kafouros, 2022)
 - As an “**escape route**” for companies in turbulent times (Witt & Lewin, 2007)

H2: The negative impact of country’s populism on firm’s NPD is weakened for the exporting firms.

Hypothesis 3

Populism & Right-leaning tendency & NPD:

- **The impact of populism depends on the tendency of the host ideology to the left and right.**
- **Right-wing governance with populism:**
 - Pascale (2019): right-wing authoritarianism tends to use weaponized language for political purposes
 - Four interrelated components: propaganda, disinformation, censorship and secular discourse (Pascale, 2019)
 - **Discourse weaponization:** compared with left and center parties, right-wing parties, especially far-right parties, have a greater tendency to deliberately use populist discourse to create an atmosphere of social threat (Pascale, 2019)
 - Extreme and ineffective policies (Hartwell & Devinney, 2021; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2022)

Hypothesis 3: The negative impact of country's populism on firm's NPD is strengthened for the right-wing governments.

Data and Methods

Data Source

- World Bank's WBES (World Bank Enterprise Survey)
- GPD (Global Populism Database)
- 24,375 firm data from 38 countries (most are located in Latin America and Europe)
- 62 national leaders from 2006 to 2018

Methods

- Logistic regression
- Marginal effect Simulation Analysis (Zelner, 2009)

Data and Methods

Table 1. List of leaders, country, year, populism points, and party in the sample

Leader	Country	Years	Populism	Party
Berisha	Albania	2005-2013	0~0.1375	Democratic Party
Néstor Kirchner	Argentina	2003 - 2007	0.25	Front for Victory
Cristina Fernández	Argentina	2008-2015	0	Front for Victory
Serzh Sargsyan	Armenia	2008-2018	0.2~0.75	Republican Party
Alexander Lukashenko	Belarus	1994-current	0.4~1.25	Independent
Evo Morales	Bolivia	2006-2019	1~1.5	Movement for Socialism
Lula	Brazil	2003-2010	0.25	Workers' Party
Stanishev	Bulgaria	2005-2009	0.0833333	Bulgarian Socialist Party
Boyko Borisov	Bulgaria	2009-2013	0.625	GERB
Lagos	Chile	2000-2006	0.083333333	Party for Democracy
Michelle Bachelet	Chile	2006-2010	0	Socialist Party of Chile
Sebastián Piñera	Chile	2010-2014	0	National Renewal
Uribe	Colombia	2002-2010	0	Social National Unity Party
Juan Manuel Santos	Colombia	2010-2018	0~0.0625	Social National Unity Party
Stjepan Mesić	Croatia	2000-2010	0.5	Independent
Ivo Josipović	Croatia	2010-2015	0.175	Social Democratic Party
Vaclav Klaus	Czech Republic	2008-2013	1	Independent
Petr Nečas	Czech Republic	2010-2013	0.15	Civic Democratic Party
Leonel Fernández	Dominican Republic	2008-2012	0.25	Dominican Liberation Party
Danilo Medina	Dominican Republic	2016-current	0.375	Dominican Liberation Party
Alfredo Palacio	Ecuador	2005-2006	0.3888889	Independent
Rafael Correa	Ecuador	2009-2013	1.733333	Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance
Lenín Moreno	Ecuador	2017-current	0.1875	Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance
Mauricio Funes	El Salvador	2009-2014	0.625	Farabundo Martí National Liberational Front

Leader	Country	Years	Populism	Party
Andrus Ansip	Estonia	2007-2011	0.125	Estonian Reform Party
Mikheil Saakashvili	Georgia	2008-2012	0.375	United National Movement
Giorgi Margvelashvili	Georgia	2013-2018	0.325	Independent
Óscar Berger	Guatemala	2004-2007	0	National Solidarity Party
Álvaro Colom Caballero	Guatemala	2008-2011	0.125	National Unity of Hope
Manuel Zelaya	Honduras	2006-2009	0.5	Liberal Party of Honduras
Porfirio Lobo Sosa	Honduras	2010-2013	0.3333333	National Party
Ferenc Gyurcsány	Hungary	2004-2009	0	Hungarian Socialist Party
Viktor Orbán	Hungary	2010-current	0.875	The Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance
Manmohan Singh	India	2009-2014	0	Indian National Congress
Narendra Modi	India	2014-current	0.55	Bharatiya Janata Party
Nursultan Nazarbayev I	Kazakhstan	2006-2011	0.125	Radiant Fatherland
Valdis Dombrovskis	Latvia	2009-2014	0	The New Era Party/Unity
Dalia Grybauskaitė	Lithuania	2009-2014	0.275	Independent
Vicente Fox	Mexico	2001-2006	0.25	National Action Party
Felipe Calderón	Mexico	2007-2012	0.125	National Action Party
Vlad Filat	Moldova	2009-2013	0.375	Democratic Party of Moldova
Nicolae Timofti	Moldova	2012-2016	0.0375	Independent
Milo Đukanović	Montenegro	2008-2016	0~0.1666667	Democratic Party of Socialists
Enrique Bolaños	Nicaragua	2002-2006	0	Constitutionalist Liberal Party
Daniel Ortega	Nicaragua	2007-current	0.85	Sandinista National Liberation Front
Martín Torrijos	Panama	2004-2009	0.2222222	Democratic Revolutionary Party
Ricardo Martinelli	Panama	2009-2014	0.5	Democratic Change

Data and Methods

Table 1. List of leaders, country, year, populism points, and party in the sample (continued)

Leader	Country	Year	Populism Points	Party
Nicanor Duarte	Paraguay	2003-2008	0.5	The National Republican Association - Colorado Party
Fernando Lugo	Paraguay	2008-2012	0	Patriotic Alliance for Change
Alejandro Toledo	Peru	2001-2006	0.333333333	Possible Peru
Alan García	Peru	2006-2011	1	Alianza Popular Revolucionario de las Americas
Lech Kaczynski	Poland	2005-2010	0.75	Law and Justice
Traian Băsescu	Romania	2009-2014	0	Democratic Liberal Party
Viktor Ponta	Romania	2012-2015	0.375	Social Democrat Party
Vladimir Putin	Russia	2008-current	0.025-0.5	United Russia
Boris Tadić	Serbia	2008-2012	0.125	Democratic Party
Tomislav Nikolić	Serbia	2012-2017	0.333333333	Serbian Progressive Party
Recep T. Erdogan	Turkey	2007-2014	0.875	Justice and Development Party
Viktor Yanukovich	Ukraine	2005-2014	1.125	Our Ukraine-People's Self Defence Bloc
Viktor Yanukovich	Ukraine	2010-2014	0.625	Party of Regions
Tabaré Vázquez	Uruguay	2005-2010	0.25	Broad Front
José Mujica	Uruguay	2010-2015	0.125	Broad Front
Hugo Chávez	Venezuela	1996-2006	1.916667	The Fifth Republic Movement

Table 2. Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
New product	76677	.388	.487	0	1
Populism	41517	.443	.329	0	1.917
Right-wing	41517	.465	.499	0	1
Export	107579	10.193	25.496	0	100
POLCON	89046	.465	.267	0	.852
Foreign ownership	108935	.078	.268	0	1
Formal start	108935	.883	.321	0	1
Pro concentration	104688	82.822	22.601	0	100
Informal competition	102786	.521	.5	0	1
Firm age	108935	19.041	14.496	1	226
Firm size	108934	3.347	1.343	0	11.067
Government	108935	.006	.08	0	1
GDP	106385	8.088	1.032	5.616	10.501
Manufacturing sector	108935	.525	.499	0	1

Correlations

Table 3. Correlations analysis

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) New product	1.000													
(2) Populism	-0.086	1.000												
(3) Right-wing	0.011	0.054	1.000											
(4) Export	0.054	0.026	0.014	1.000										
(5) POLCON	0.068	-0.093	0.595	-0.042	1.000									
(6) Foreign	0.068	-0.070	-0.091	0.175	-0.089	1.000								
(7) Formal_start	0.001	0.024	-0.005	0.035	0.027	0.028	1.000							
(8) Product concentration	-0.146	0.179	0.200	0.011	0.231	-0.097	0.070	1.000						
(9) Informal competition	0.053	-0.052	-0.043	-0.031	-0.067	-0.018	-0.085	-0.104	1.000					
(10) Firm age	0.123	-0.101	0.075	0.058	0.048	0.050	-0.120	-0.149	0.072	1.000				
(11) Firm size	0.193	0.004	0.118	0.259	0.084	0.175	0.045	-0.050	-0.031	0.281	1.000			
(12) Government	-0.006	0.026	-0.047	0.002	-0.070	-0.012	-0.001	-0.011	-0.019	0.035	0.037	1.000		
(13) GDP	-0.082	-0.269	-0.501	0.054	-0.498	0.098	0.029	-0.218	0.017	-0.048	-0.101	0.027	1.000	
(14) Manufacturing sector	0.138	0.002	0.234	0.152	0.200	0.016	-0.013	0.016	0.064	0.204	0.220	-0.017	-0.210	1.000

Main Results 1

Table 4. Logistic model results for firm's new product development

	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5						
Explanatory Variables											
Populism	-2.234*** (0.003)	-3.457*** (0.003)	-3.580*** (0.002)	-3.813*** (0.002)	-3.943*** (0.001)						
Export		0.001** (0.035)	0.001* (0.085)	0.001** (0.035)	0.001* (0.085)	Firm age	-0.001 (0.25)	-0.001 (0.303)	-0.001 (0.306)	-0.001 (0.303)	-0.001 (0.306)
Right-wing		4.902*** (0.004)	5.014*** (0.004)	2.568** (0.031)	2.633** (0.028)	Firm size	0.230*** (0.000)	0.223*** (0.000)	0.224*** (0.000)	0.223*** (0.000)	0.224*** (0.000)
Interactions						Government	-0.124 (0.631)	-0.107 (0.678)	-0.107 (0.681)	-0.107 (0.678)	-0.107 (0.681)
Populism x Export			0.045** (0.012)		0.045** (0.012)	GDP	1.213** (0.029)	-2.589*** (0.001)	-2.662*** (0.001)	1.022*** (0.000)	1.020*** (0.000)
Populism x Right-wing				-2.101*** (0.000)	-2.143*** (0.000)	Manufacturing sector	0.313*** (0.000)	0.303*** (0.000)	0.302*** (0.000)	0.303*** (0.000)	0.302*** (0.000)
Control Variables						Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
POLCON	4.751*** (0.001)	5.687*** (0.000)	5.827*** (0.000)	-1.393*** (0.000)	-1.392*** (0.000)	Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Foreign ownership	0.198*** (0.009)	0.184** (0.016)	0.196** (0.01)	0.184** (0.016)	0.196** (0.01)	Number of observations	24375	24290	24290	24290	24290
Formal start	0.249*** (0.000)	0.247*** (0.000)	0.247*** (0.000)	0.247*** (0.000)	0.247*** (0.000)	Constant	-12.686** 0.028	23.842*** 0.001	24.542*** 0.001	-5.566*** 0.000	-5.448*** 0.000
Product concentration	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.000)	R-squared	0.1031	0.1035	0.1037	0.1035	0.1037
Informal competition	0.053* (0.078)	0.054* (0.069)	0.052* (0.083)	0.054* (0.069)	0.052* (0.083)	chi2	2742.87	2737.449	2731.621	2737.449	2731.621
						Log Likelihood	-14757.9	-14703.7	-14700.1	-14703.7	-14700.1
						aic	29597.73	29491.43	29486.21	29491.43	29486.21
						bic	29929.89	29831.53	29834.42	29831.53	29834.42

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Main Results 2

Table 6. Logistic model results for new process development

	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5						
Explanatory Variables											
Populism	-3.173*** (0.000)	-5.883*** (0.000)	-5.958*** (0.000)	-6.605*** (0.000)	-6.684*** (0.000)						
Export		0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	Firm age	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Right-wing		11.202*** (0.000)	11.255*** (0.000)	6.462*** (0.000)	6.491*** (0.000)	Firm size	0.271*** (0.000)	0.256*** (0.000)	0.256*** (0.000)	0.256*** (0.000)	0.256*** (0.000)
Interactions						Government	-0.092 (0.731)	-0.138 (0.61)	-0.138 (0.613)	-0.138 (0.61)	-0.138 (0.613)
Populism x Export			0.032* (0.064)		0.032* (0.064)	GDP	3.085*** (0.000)	-5.666*** (0.000)	-5.707*** (0.000)	1.666*** (0.000)	1.662*** (0.000)
Populism x Right-wing				-4.267*** (0.000)	-4.288*** (0.000)	Manufacturing sector	0.118*** (0.001)	0.098*** (0.005)	0.097*** (0.006)	0.098*** (0.005)	0.097*** (0.006)
Control Variables						Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
POLCON	9.568*** (0.000)	11.651*** (0.000)	11.725*** (0.000)	-2.724*** (0.000)	-2.722*** (0.000)	Country FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Foreign ownership	0.032 (0.669)	-0.015 (0.84)	-0.007 (0.928)	-0.015 (0.84)	-0.007 (0.928)	Number of observations	24300	24216	24216	24216	24216
Formal start	0.206*** (0.001)	0.200*** (0.001)	0.199*** (0.001)	0.200*** (0.001)	0.199*** (0.001)	Constant	-34.443*** 0.000	49.683*** 0.000	50.075*** 0.000	-10.031*** 0.000	-9.939*** 0.000
Product concentration	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	R-squared	0.1365	0.1378	0.1379	0.1378	0.1379
Informal competition	0.098*** (0.001)	0.107*** (0.001)	0.105*** (0.001)	0.107*** (0.001)	0.105*** (0.001)	chi2	3598.261	3595.822	3591.58	3595.821	3591.586
						Log Likelihood	-14408.99	-14341.86	-14339.98	-14341.86	-14339.98
						aic	28899.99	28767.72	28765.97	28767.72	28765.97
						bic	29232.01	29107.7	29114.04	29107.7	29114.04

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results

Figure 4. Moderation of export





Figure 5. Moderation of right-leaning tendency



Ideology fluctuation and innovation

DV= New product development	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SD of leading party's ideology (10 years)	0.054*** (0.006)			
SD of parties' weighted-mean ideology (10 years)		-0.126*** (0.031)		
CV of leading party's ideology (10 years)			-0.013*** (0.002)	
CV of parties' weighted-mean ideology (10 years)				-0.003*** (0.000)
Export	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Firm age	0.005** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Firm size	0.125*** (0.022)	0.116*** (0.022)	0.119*** (0.022)	0.117*** (0.022)
Foreign	0.558*** (0.101)	0.641*** (0.101)	0.615*** (0.101)	0.616*** (0.101)
GDP per Capita	0.306*** (0.053)	0.133** (0.057)	0.181*** (0.052)	0.143*** (0.053)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-17.474 (431.342)	-13.635 (374.029)	-15.204 (553.856)	-14.824 (553.856)
N	7,745	7,745	7,745	7,745

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2}$$

Coefficient of Variance = $\frac{\sigma}{\mu}$

Contributions and Implications

- Further combined the concept of **populism with the strategic field**, examining the relationship between populism and the development of new corporate products, **extending beyond political science**.
- Added two moderators that affect firms' new product development in a populist context: **exports** and **party ideology**
- Filled the empirical research on **the effectiveness of exports** in the volatility of the firm's **non-market environment**
- The **particular combination of populism** as a thin-centered ideology when applied by parties of different ideologies (filling the gap in the previous research about the diversity of influences of party ideology)
- Relative bargaining power & Risk management
- Offensive speeches & Rational policies of leaders

Thanks
